Links table
Abstract/zusammenfassung
Leaflets
Thanks and appreciation
Chapter 1: Introduction
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introduction
1.1 Overview of the thesis contributions
1.2 The thesis of the outline
Chapter 2: The background
2.1 Blockchains and smart contracts
2.2 Rules for setting the priority of the transaction
2.3 Determining the priorities of the transaction and the transparency of the dispute
2.4 The decentralized judgment
2.5 Blockchain expansion with layer solutions 2.0
Chapter 3. Rules for setting the priority of the transaction
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Standards for defining treatment priorities
3.1 methodology
3.2 Standard commitment analysis
3.3 Investigation of criteria violations
3.4 Dark transactions
3.5 final notes
Chapter 4. Determining the priorities of the transaction and the transparency of the dispute
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Determine the priorities of the transaction and the transparency of competition
4.1 methodology
4.2 on the transparency of the competition
4.3 on the transparency of priority
4.4 Final notes
Chapter 5, the decentralized judgment
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Decentralization
5.1 methodology
5.2 attacks on governance
5.3 Carrier’s governance
5.4 final notes
Chapter 6. Related work
6.1 Rules for setting the priority of the transaction
6.2 Defining the priorities of the transaction and the transparency of the dispute
6.3 The decentralized judgment
Chapter 7. Discussion, restrictions and future work
7.1 Treatment arrangement
7.2 transaction transparency
7.3 The voting force distribution to amend smart contracts
conclusion
Pursuit
Appendix A: An additional analysis of the standards for defining the priorities of transactions
Approach B: An additional analysis to determine the priorities of transactions and the transparency of the dispute
Approach A: An additional analysis of the distribution of the voting force
index
conclusion
In this thesis, we adopted an approach based on data to examine fairness within the Blockchain contexts, focusing on three main aspects: (1) fairness in the request; (2) Equity in transparency; And (3) fairness in the voting authority to amend the requests of the smart contract.
The results we have reached reveal the existence of a contrast between the criteria for defining the assumed priorities and actual practices within the Blockchain community. In particular, miners often deviate from these standards by setting the priorities of transactions that serve their own interests or friendly miners. This contradicts the principle of defining fee -based priorities exclusively.
Through active experiments, we discovered cases of collusion from miners that involve dark transactions. These transactions provide miners with incentives outside the chain in an uneven way, which contributes to a lack of transparency in the ecosystem. These special fees are preserved between miners and a specific source of treatment, even after confirmation of the Blockchain transaction. This exacerbates the challenge of accurately estimating the fees. As a result, transactions are struggled to determine the appropriate fees because they do not have a complete vision for all the transactions that are presented.
In addition, Blockchain, or smart contracts, are often modified by governance protocols. These protocols aim to distribute the decision -making authority among the participants. However, we see that the concentration of the voting force based on the ownership of the distinctive symbol deviates from the dynamics of decision -making. A small sub -group of participants with an important symbolic portion includes an inconsistent effects, allowing them to form proposals and sounds in line with their self -interest. This real decentralization of the Blockchain Decision System.
We believe that the results we find provide valuable visions to design new and more just groups. In addition, to ensure the cloning of our results, we made the code and data used in this thesis available to the public (Messenger, 2023A, B).
Appendix A: An additional analysis of the standards for defining the priorities of transactions
A.1 congestion at MEMPOOL from the Data set b
The congestion in Mimpol is typical not only in (as discussed in paragraph 3.2.1), but also in B. Actually, the A.1 figure reveals a large contrast in Mempool congestion, which is much higher than those observed in A. MEMPOOL fluctuations in almost one time. On about 22 June, there was an increase in Bitcoin price after the Facebook balance ads[21] Another rise on June 25, after news of the US dollar declining (Paul R. La Monica, 2019). Prices have increased significantly from the number of transactions issued, which in turn provided delays. As a result, sometimes, Mimpol takes a much longer period than in A to be drained all transactions.
A.2 The importance of transactions fees
Table A.1 shows the contribution of transaction fees towards mining workers ’revenues in all allocated blocs from 2016 to 2020. In 2018, the fees constituted an average of 3.19 % of the total mining workers’ revenues for each block; In 2019 and 2020 it was 2.75 % and 6.29 %, respectively. However, if we look at only May 2020 (i.e., a mining bonus 6.25 BTC), the fees represent, on average, 8.90 % with sexually transmitted diseases. From 6.54 % in total. Therefore, Easley et al., 2017, and tend to continue.
A.3 The prices of transaction fees through mining gatherings
A.4 on fees and congestion prices
In Figure A. (In distribution, therefore on average)
From those in low congestion levels. Therefore, users increase transactions to alleviate the spinning delays during congestion.
A.5 Children’s transactions versus parents (CPFP)
A.6 Mining workers behavior during the fraud process
To study the behavior of miners during a fraud attack on Twitter from July 14 to August 9, 2020, we chose all the dedicated blocs (3697 per total, which contains 8,318,621 Be poolin (B: 565; H: 15.28 %), F2pool (B: 536; H: 14.5 %), BTC.com (B: 424; H: 11.47 %), Antpool (B: 404; H: 10.93 %), Huobi (B: 353; H: 9.55 %)
A.7 Transaction compensation fees
In this experiment, we compare the speed of transactions to accelerate the model treatment fees in Bitcoin. To this end, we recovered a snapshot containing 26,332 unconfirmed transactions from MEMPOOL for our knot on November 24, 2020 at 10:08:41 UTC. After that, for each transaction, we searched for the speed of its transactions (or acceleration fees) through the acceleration service provided by BTC.com (BTC.com, 2022). We have concluded the acceleration fees of 23,341 (88.64 %) out of 2,6332 unconfirmed transactions. Figure A.6 CDF shows each Bitcoin treatment fee and acceleration fees provided by BTC.com. An average acceleration fee is 566.3 times (4,734.67 of sexually transmitted diseases) and an average of 116.64 times of bitcoin treatment fees. At the time of this experiment, 1 BTC was $ 18,875.10.
author:
(1) Jonnatan Messenger Peixoto Affonso
[21] On June 18, Facebook announced an encrypted currency, LIBRA, which was later renamed to Diem. https://www.diem.com
