Links table
Abstract and 1. Introduction
2 methodology
3 devices
4 programs
5 network
6 consensus
7 Economies of Crusher Currency
8 applications interface customer
9 Judgment
10 geography
11 case studies
12 discussion and references
A. Decentralization and policy making
Software test
C. Get brief reviews for each layer
D. Decentralization
E. It carries the error and decentralization
6 consensus
Protocols like bitcoin [78]Khawarzaf [40]Or ouroboros Praos [78]Enabling resources to engage in the protocol directly with (mainly) any amount of resources they have. In these protocols, producers can block, although they do not have to form alliances called swimming pools. In POW, the “leader” of the complex verifies the transactions, and organizes it in a candidate bloc, while each member is implementing the prisoner’s mystery of the mass made by the leader. If one of the members succeeds, the commander collects and distributes the mass bonus, in proportion to the authority of each member. At points of sale, the leader has full control of the creation of the mass, while members only pay fees to delegate their exciting rights to the leader and collect rewards. Assembly behavior is also driven by time discount [146]That is, the tendency to have no rare or late rewards. In essence, a small mine worker may prefer small repeated payments, at the expense of some fees, on rare large payments, when producing a block.
Other systems, like the universe [114] And EOS [92]Imposing restrictions on the parties that can participate in consensus and require the rest to delegate its resources to a representative knot or “verification”. This “barrier in front of entry” means that any party without sufficient share, that is, below the sill of the system or less than its competitors, is required to delegate their exciting rights to the auditor. In every “era”, the (fixed number of) committee is elected to operate the protocol. The election mechanism depends on voting, as the resource delegation is a voting process.
In both types of systems, there are two interesting resources: 1) Participating force, for example, mathematical or share; 2) Participated force delegated, including the ability to choose mass content. Accordingly, the relevant parties are: 1) miners and stakeholders, who have retail and participating, respectively; 2) Princess leaders and delegates, who control how to use resources.
The professor’s notebook is usually guaranteed if the parties that represent a total majority of the participating force are honest (that is, they follow the protocol as described) [78]. Therefore, the focus of the participating force on a few entities is a threat to the system. This danger is known, and Blockchain users and participants have tried to avoid it since at least 2014 [86]. Those who control the majority of power can harm vitality, by refusing to publish or accept some transactions, as well as safety by launching a long -term attack. Both types of attacks indirectly harm stability, because the regime’s merit is the challenge.
The second anxiety revolves around the mass proposals. The proposal is a party that maintains Mimpol and chooses the transactions that are added to a block and with any arrangement. Initially, there was one party as both the proposal and construction. As the requirements of the devices needed to operate the full node and form the gatherings, the proposal and construction rotation were separated.
In the book of the Prisoners, the pool leader usually suggests the content of the mass, while the pool members only run Pow algorithm. Therefore, billiard members do not participate in building the mass and often do not verify its contents. Therefore, the leader may monitor the transactions (risks), steal the member rewards (the risk of stability), or may have the user’s resources to information such as IP addresses (the risk of privacy).
In addition, smart contracts provide MEV attacks [186]Which may harm stability. Here, block builders have the ability to monitor transactions before publishing and choose their request in a block, which they can use to extract value from sincere transactions. The counter -procedure that was presented is the proposal separation model (PBS), where the reliable party maintains Mimpol and suggests a mass, while the auditors are signed without observing its content (and thus the inability to exploit mev) [33]. However, the current implementation of PBS has been criticized in Ethereum to facilitate control and centralization, and therefore its benefit is still unclear [88].
Finally, the threat arises due to the lack of self -healing, that is, the inability to recover from temporary numerical acquisition. In the prisoner of war, even if the majority spoils, honest users can increase their own strength, and ultimately, toppling the opponent and restoring the safety of the professor’s book [10,13]. At the points of sale, although the transformation of energy occurs on the professor’s book, by transferring the share. If the opponent is temporarily gets to the majority, they can prohibit the transactions that transform energy from them, and thus keep controlling indefinitely (for example, the exchange of large central cryptocurrency can make it difficult to issue payments and withdrawals issued, while enabling payments between different users to exchange). Consequently, the distribution of a variety of share (see Section 7) is vital to protect against acquisitions.
